This paper investigates the fundamental performance limits of the two-user interference channel in the presence of an external eavesdropper. In this setting, we construct an inner bound, to the secrecy capacity region, based on the idea of cooperative encoding in which the two users cooperatively design their randomized codebooks and jointly optimize their channel prefixing distributions. Our achievability scheme also utilizes message-splitting in order to allow for partial decoding of the interference at the nonintended receiver. Outer bounds are then derived and used to establish the optimality of the proposed scheme in certain cases. In the Gaussian case, the previously proposed cooperative jamming and noise-forwarding techniques are shown to be special cases of our proposed approach. Overall, our results provide structural insights on how the interference can be exploited to increase the secrecy capacity of wireless networks.
. Randomized codebook of Wyner. For a given message index, a column is randomly chosen, and the corresponding channel input is transmitted. Designing the number of columns properly is the key to prove that the security constraint is met. We refer to this codebook as randomized (2-D) codebook.
Gaussian interference channels under a frequency selective fading model [11] , [12] .
This work develops a general approach for cooperative encoding for the (discrete) two-user memoryless interference channels operated in the presence of a passive eavesdropper. The proposed scheme allows for cooperation in two distinct ways:
1) The two users jointly optimize their randomized (2-D) codebooks [13] , and 2) The two users jointly introduce randomness in the transmitted signals, to confuse the eavesdropper, via a cooperative channel prefixing approach [14] . Remarkably, the two methods, respectively, are helpful in adding decodable and undecodable randomness to the channel. The proposed scheme also utilizes message-splitting and partial decoding to enlarge the achievable secrecy rate region [2] . We then derive outer bounds to the secrecy capacity region and use them to establish the optimality of the proposed scheme for some classes of channels. In addition, we argue that some coding techniques for the secure discrete multiple access channel and relay-eavesdropper channel can be obtained as special cases of our cooperative encoding approach.
Recently, noise forwarding (or jamming) has been shown to enhance the achievable secrecy rate region of several Gaussian multi-user channels (e.g., [15] , [16] ). The basic idea is to allow each transmitter to allocate only a fraction of the available power for its randomized codebook and use the rest for the generation of independent noise samples. The superposition of the two signals is then transmitted. With the appropriate power allocation policy, one can ensure that the jamming signal results in maximal ambiguity at the eavesdropper while incuring only a minimal loss in the achievable rate at the legitimate receiver(s). Our work reveals the fact that this noise injection technique can be obtained as a manifestation of the cooperative channel prefixing 0018-9448/$26.00 © 2011 IEEE approach. Based on this observation, we obtain a larger achievable region for the secrecy rate in the Gaussian multiple access channel.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II is devoted to the discrete memoryless scenario where the main results of the paper are derived and few special cases are analyzed. The analysis for the Gaussian channels, along with numerical results in selected scenarios, are given in Section III. Finally, we offer some concluding remarks in Section IV. The proofs are collected in the appendices to enhance the flow of the paper.
II. SECURITY FOR THE DISCRETE MEMORYLESS INTERFERENCE CHANNEL

A. System Model and Notations
Throughout this paper, vectors are denoted as , where we omit the subscript if , i.e.,
. Random variables are denoted with capital letters , which are defined over sets denoted by the calligraphic letters , and random vectors are denoted as bold-capital letters . Again, we drop the subscript for . We define, , , and . The delta function is defined as , if ; , if . Also, we use the following shorthand for probability distributions: , . The same notation will be used for joint distributions. For any randomized codebook, we construct rows (corresponding to message indices) and codewords per row (corresponding to randomization indices), where we refer to as the secrecy rate and as the randomization rate. (Please refer to Fig. 1 .) Finally, for a given set , for secrecy rates and for the randomization rates. Our discrete memoryless two-user interference channel with an (external) eavesdropper (IC-E) is denoted by for some finite sets (see Fig. 2 ). Here the symbols are the channel inputs and the symbols are the channel outputs observed at the decoder 1, decoder 2, and at the eavesdropper, respectively. The channel is memoryless and time-invariant:
We assume that each transmitter has a secret message which is to be transmitted to the respective receiver in channel uses and to be secured from the eavesdropper. In this setting, an secret codebook has the following components:
1) The secret message set ;
. 2) A stochastic encoding function at transmitter which maps the secret messages to the transmitted symbols: for each ;
. 3) Decoding function at receiver which maps the received symbols to an estimate of the message:
;
. The reliability of transmission is measured by the following probabilities of error for . The secrecy is measured by the equivocation rate
We say that the rate tuple is achievable for the IC-E if, for any given , there exists an secret codebook such that and (1) for sufficiently large . The secrecy capacity region is the closure of the set of all achievable rate pairs and is denoted as . Finally, we note that the secrecy requirement imposed on the full message set implies the secrecy of individual messages. In other words, implies for .
B. Inner Bound
In this section, we introduce the cooperative encoding scheme, and derive an inner bound to . The proposed strategy allows for cooperation in design of the randomized codebooks, as well as in channel prefixing [14] . This way, each user will add only a sufficient amount of randomness as the other user will help to increase the randomness seen by the eavesdropper. The achievable secrecy rate region using this approach is stated in the following result.
Theorem 1:
where denotes the set of all joint distributions of the random variables , , , , , , , , that factors as 1
and is the closure of all satisfying and (4) for a given joint distribution . is the set of all tuples satisfying (5) is the rate region defined by reversing the indices 1 and 2 everywhere in the expression for .
is the set of all tuples satisfying
Proof: We detail the coding scheme here. The rest of the proof, given in Appendix A, shows that the proposed coding scheme satisfies both the reliability and the security constraints. , and assign each pair to a secret message . Note that, for . Every node in the network knows these codebooks.
Encoding: Consider again user . To send , user gets corresponding indices and . Then user obtains the following codewords: • From the codebook for , user randomly chooses a codeword in bin according to the uniform distribution, where the codeword index is denoted by and it gets the corresponding entry of the codebook, i.e., . • Similarly, from the codebook for , user randomly chooses a codeword in bin according to the uniform distribution, where the codeword index is denoted by and it gets the corresponding entry of the codebook, i.e., . • Finally, from the codebook for , it randomly chooses a codeword, which is denoted by . Then, user , generates the channel inputs , where each entry is chosen according to using the codewords , , and ; and it transmits the constructed in channel uses. See Fig. 3 . Decoding: Here we remark that although each user needs to decode only its own message, we also require receivers to decode common and other information of the other transmitter. Suppose receiver 1 has received . Let denote the set of typical sequences. Decoder 1 chooses , , if such a tuple exists and is unique. Otherwise, the decoder declares an error. Decoding at receiver 2 is symmetric and a description of it can be obtained by reversing the indices 1 and 2 above.
Refer to Appendix A for the rest of the proof.
The following remarks are now in order.
1) The auxiliary random variable serves as a time-sharing parameter.
2) The auxiliary variable is used to construct the common secure signal of transmitter 1 that has to be decoded at both receivers, where the randomized encoding technique of [13] is used for this construction. Similarly, is used for the common secured signal of user 2.
3) The auxiliary variable is used to construct the self secure signal that has to be decoded at receiver 1 but not at receiver 2, where the randomized encoding technique of [13] is used for this construction. Similarly, is used for the self secure signal of user 2. 4) The auxiliary variable is used to construct the other signal of transmitter 1 that has to be decoded at receiver 2 but not at receiver 1 (conventional random coding [17] is used to construct this signal). Similarly, is used for the other signal of user 2. Note that we use , , and set . 5) Compared to the Han-Kobayashi scheme [2] , the common and self random variables are constructed with randomized (2-D) codebooks. This way, they are used not only for transmitting information, but also for adding randomness. Moreover, we have two additional random variables in this achievability scheme. These extra random variables, namely and , are used to facilitate cooperation among the network users by adding extra randomness to the channel which has to be decoded by the nonintended receiver. We note that, compared to random variables and , the randomization added via is considered as interference at the receiver . 6) The gain that can be leveraged from cooperative encoding can be attributed to the freedom in the allocation of randomization rates at the two users (e.g., see (6)). This allows the users to cooperatively add randomness to impair the eavesdropper with a minimal impact on the achievable rate at the legitimate receivers. Cooperative channel prefixing, on the other hand, can be achieved by the joint optimization of the probabilistic channel prefixes and .
C. Outer Bounds
Theorem 2: For any
where is the set of joint distributions that factors as
Proof: Refer to Appendix B.
Theorem 3: For channels satisfying (9) for any distribution that factors as , an upper bound on the sum-rate of the IC-E is given by (10) where , , and are auxiliary random variables, and is the set of joint distributions that factors as Proof: Refer to Appendix C.
The previous sum-rate upper bound also holds for the set of channels satisfying (11) for any distribution that factors as . Finally, it is evident that one can obtain another upper bound by reversing the indices 1 and 2 in above expressions.
D. Special Cases
This section focuses on few special cases, where sharp results on the secrecy capacity region can be derived. In all these scenarios, achievability is established using the proposed cooperative encoding scheme. To simplify the presentation, we first define the following set of probability distributions. For random variables and
Corollary 4: If the IC-E satisfies (12) for all input distributions that factors as , then its secrecy capacity region is given by where is the set of rate-tuples satisfying (13) for any . Proof: Refer to Appendix D.
Corollary 5: If the IC-E satisfies (14) for all input distributions that factors as , then its secrecy sum capacity is given as follows:
Proof: Refer to Appendix E.
Corollary 6:
If the IC-E satisfies (15) for all input distributions that factors as , then its secrecy sum capacity is given as follows:
We also note that, in this case, will not increase the sum-rate, and hence, we can set Proof: Refer to Appendix F.
Another case for which the cooperative encoding approach can attain the sum-capacity is the following.
Corollary 7:
If the IC-E satisfies (16) for all input distributions that factors as , then its secrecy sum capacity is given as follows:
Proof: Refer to Appendix G. Now, we use our results on the IC-E to shed more light on the secrecy capacity of the discrete memoryless multiple access channel. In particular, it is easy to see that the multiple access channel with an eavesdropper (MAC-E) defined by is equivalent to the IC-E defined by . This allows for specializing the results obtained earlier to the MAC-E.
Corollary 8:
is achievable, where the channel is given by . Furthermore, the following result characterizes the secrecy sum rate of the weak MAC-E.
Corollary 9 (MAC-E With a Weak Eavesdropper):
If the eavesdropper is weak for the MAC-E, i.e., (17) for all input distributions that factor as , then the secure sum-rate capacity is characterized as the following:
Proof: Refer to Appendix H.
Another special case of our model is the relay-eavesdropper channel with a deaf helper. In this scenario, transmitter 1 has a secret message for receiver 1 and transmitter 2 is only interested in helping transmitter 1 in increasing its secure transmission rates. Here, the random variable at transmitter 2 is utilized to add randomness to the network. Again, the regions given earlier can be specialized to this scenario. For example, the following region is achievable for this relay-eavesdropper model (18) where denotes the probability distributions in with a deterministic . For this relay-eavesdropper scenario, the noise forwarding (NF) scheme proposed in [18] achieves the following rate:
where The following result shows that NF is a special case of the cooperative encoding scheme and provides a simplification of the achievable secrecy rate.
Corollary 10:
, where can be simplified as follows: (20) Proof: Refer to Appendix I.
Finally, the next result establishes the optimality of NF in certain relay-eavesdropper channels.
Corollary 11: Noise Forwarding scheme is optimal for the relay-eavesdropper channels which satisfy (21) for all input distributions that factor as , and the corresponding secrecy capacity is
Proof: Refer to Appendix J.
III. SECURITY FOR THE GAUSSIAN INTERFERENCE CHANNEL
A. Inner Bound and Numerical Results
In its standard form [19] , the two user Gaussian Interference Channel with an Eavesdropper (GIC-E) is given by (22) where is the noise at each receiver and the average power constraints are for . The secrecy capacity region of the GIC-E is denoted as . The goal here is to specialize the results obtained in the previous section to the Gaussian scenario and illustrate the gains that can be leveraged from the cooperative coding for randomized codebooks and for channel prefixing, and from time sharing. For this scenario, the Gaussian codebooks are used and the same regions will be achievable after taking into account the power constraint at the users. Towards this end, we will need the following definitions. Consider a probability mass function on the time sharing parameter denoted by . Let denote the set of all possible power allocations, i.e.,
Now, we define a set of joint distributions for the Gaussian case as follows:
where the Gaussian model given in (22) gives . Using this set of distributions, we obtain the following achievable secrecy rate region for the GIC-E.
Corollary 12:
. It is interesting to see that our particular choice of the channel prefixing distribution in the above corollary corresponds to a superposition coding approach where . This observation establishes the fact that noise injection scheme of [15] and jamming scheme of [16] are special cases of the channel prefixing technique of [14] .
The following computationally simple subregion will be used to generate some of our numerical results.
Corollary 13:
, where , and Another simplification can be obtained from the following TDMA-like approach. Here we divide the channel uses into two parts of lengths represented by and , where and is assumed to be an integer. During the first period, transmitter 1 generates randomized codewords using power and transmitter 2 jams the channel using power . For the second period, the roles of the users are reversed, where the users use powers and . We refer to this scheme cooperative TDMA (C-TDMA) which achieves the following region.
Corollary 14:
, where where (23) and (24) Proof: This is a subregion of the , where we use a time sharing random variable satisfying and , and utilize the random variables and . The proof also follows by respective single-user Gaussian wiretap channel result [20] with the modified noise variances due to the jamming signals.
In the C-TDMA scheme above, we only add randomness by noise injection at the helper node. However, our cooperative encoding scheme (Corollary 12) allows for the implementation of more general cooperation strategies. For example, in a more general TDMA approach, each user can help the other via both the design of randomized codebook and channel prefixing (i.e., the noise forwarding scheme described in Section III-B.II). In addition, one can develop enhanced transmission strategies with a time-sharing random variable of cardinality greater than 2.
We now provide numerical results for the following subregions of the achievable region given in Corollary 12.
• : Here we utilize both cooperative randomized codebook design and channel prefixing. • : Here we utilize either cooperative randomized codebook design (rc) or channel prefixing (cp) scheme at a transmitter, but not both. •
: Here we only utilize cooperative randomized codebook design, no channel prefixing (ncp) is implemented. • : This region is an example of utilizing both time-sharing and cooperative channel prefixing. • : This region is a subregion of , for which we set the jamming powers to zero. The first scenario depicted in Fig. 4 shows the gain offered by the cooperative encoding technique, as compared with the various cooperative TDMA approaches. Also, it is shown that cooperative channel prefixing does not increase the secrecy rate region in this particular scenario. In Fig. 5 , we consider a channel with a rather capable eavesdropper. In this case, it is straightforward to verify that the corresponding single user channels have zero secrecy capacities. However, with the appropriate cooperation strategies between the two interfering users, the two users can achieve nonzero rates (as reported in the figure). In Fig. 6 , we consider an asymmetric scenario, in which the first user has a weak channel to the eavesdropper, but the second user has a strong channel to the eavesdropper. In this case, the proposed cooperative encoding technique allows the second user to achieve a positive secure transmission rate, which is not possible by exploiting only the channel prefixing and time-sharing techniques. In addition, by prefixing the channel, the second user can help the first one to increase its secure transmission rate. Finally, we note that for some channel coefficients outperforms and for some others outperforms . Therefore, in general, the proposed techniques (cooperative randomized codebook design, cooperative channel prefixing, and time-sharing) should be exploited simultaneously as considered in Corollary 12. 
B. Special Cases 1) Multiple Access Channel: First, we define a set of probability distributions
Using this notation, one can easily see that the region in Corollary 12 reduces to the following achievable secrecy rate region for the Gaussian Multiple Access Channel with an Eavesdropper (GMAC-E) where the expressions in the region are calculated for the channel given by . The region generalizes the one obtained in [16] for the two user case. The underlying reason is that, in the achievable scheme of [16] , the users are either transmitting their codewords or jamming the channel whereas, in our approach, the users can transmit their codewords and jam the channel simultaneously. In addition, our cooperative TDMA approach generalizes the one proposed in [16] , as we allow the two users to cooperate in the design of randomized codebooks and channel prefixing during the time slots dedicated to either one.
2) The Relay-Eavesdropper Channel: In the previous section, we argued that the noise forwarding (NF) scheme of [18] can be obtained as a special case of our generalized cooperation scheme. Here, we demonstrate the positive impact of channel prefixing on increasing the achievable secrecy rate of the Gaussian relay-eavesdropper channel. In particular, the proposed region for the Gaussian IC-E, when specialized to the Gaussian relay-eavesdropper setting, results in where One the other hand, noise forwarding with no channel prefixing (GNF-ncp) results in the following achievable rate:
where we choose and in the expression of (see also [18] ). Numerically, the positive impact of channel prefixing is illustrated in the following example. First, it is easy to see that the following secrecy rate is achievable with channel prefixing since (i.e., we set and ). Now, we let and , resulting in and if .
IV. CONCLUSION
This work considered the two-user interference channel with an (external) eavesdropper. An inner bound on the achievable secrecy rate region was derived using a scheme that combines cooperative randomized codebook design, channel prefixing, message splitting, and time-sharing techniques. More specifically, our achievable scheme allows the two users to cooperatively construct their randomized codebooks and channel prefixing distributions. Outer bounds are then derived and used to establish the optimality of the proposed scheme in some special cases. For the Gaussian scenario, channel prefixing was used to allow the users to transmit independently generated noise samples using a fraction of the available power. Moreover, as a special case of time sharing, we have developed a novel cooperative TDMA scheme, where a user can add structured and unstructured noise to the channel during the allocated slot for the other user. It is shown that this scheme reduces to the noise forwarding scheme proposed earlier for the relay-eavesdropper channel. In the Gaussian multiple-access setting, our cooperative encoding and channel prefixing scheme was shown to enlarge the achievable regions obtained in previous works. The most interesting aspect of our results is, perhaps, the illumination of the role of interference in cooperatively adding randomness to increase the achievable secrecy rates in multi-user networks. APPENDIX A PROOF OF THEOREM 1 1) Probability of Error Analysis: Below we show that the decoding error probability of user averaged over the ensemble can be arbitrarily made small for sufficiently large . This demonstrates the existence of a codebook with the property that , for any given . The analysis follows from similar arguments given in [2] . See also [17] for joint typical decoding error computations. Here, for any given , each receiver can decode corresponding messages given above with an error probability less than as , if the rates satisfy the following equations:
2) Equivocation Computation: We first write the following:
(28) where we use the set notation to ease the presentation, and the inequalities are due to the fact that conditioning does not increase entropy.
Here Lastly, for any , , ,
, and , we have , for some as . This is due to the Fano's inequality together with the randomized codebook construction: Given all the message (bin) indices of two users, eavesdropper can decode the randomization indices among those bins. Due to joint typicality, this latter argument holds as long as the rates satisfy the following equations:
This follows as given bin indices , , , and , this reduces to MAC probability of error computation among the codewords of those bins. See [17] 
Then, we consider the following bound:
where the first inequality is due to Lemma 15 given at the end of this section, the second inequality is due to the Fano's inequality at the receiver 1 with some as , the last equality is due to observations and (see [14, Lemma 7] ).
We define , , and
. Using standard techniques (see, e.g., [17] ), we introduce a random variable , which is uniformly distributed over , and continue as below (39) where the last inequality follows from the fact that , which implies after using the fact that conditioning does not increase entropy, and the last equality follows by using a standard information theoretic argument in which we define random variables for the single-letter expression, e.g., has the same distribution as . Hence, we obtain the bound (40) for some auxiliary random variables that factors as . 
where the second equality follows by , and the last inequality follows due to the fact that conditioning does not increase entropy. Second statement follows from a similar observation.
APPENDIX C PROOF OF THEOREM 3
From arguments given in [5, Lemma] , the assumed property of the channel implies the following:
Then, by considering and , for , we get (43)
We continue as follows:
where the first inequality is due to the Fano's inequality at the receiver 1 with some as , the second inequality follows from (43), the third one is due to conditioning can not increase entropy, and the last one follows from the Fano's inequality at the receiver 2 with some as . We then proceed following the standard techniques given in [13] , [14] . We first state the following definitions:
where for random variable . Then, we bound the sum rate as follows:
where the first inequality is due to the secrecy requirement, the last inequality follows by (44), and the last equality follows by the fact that and , which can be shown using arguments similar to [14, Lemma 7] .
. Using standard techniques (see, e.g., [17] ), we introduce a random variable , which is uniformly distributed over , and continue as below (49) where, using a standard information theoretic argument, we have defined the random variables for the single-letter expression, e.g., has the same distribution as . Now, due to the memoryless property of the channel, we have , which implies . , due to the first condition given in (12) .
APPENDIX E PROOF OF COROLLARY 5
Achievability follows from Theorem 1 by only utilizing and together with the channel condition given in (14) . For a given , if , we set ; otherwise we assign the following rates:
where and . Converse follows from Theorem 3 as the needed condition is satisfied by the channel.
APPENDIX F PROOF OF COROLLARY 6
Achievability follows from Theorem 1 by only utilizing and together with the channel condition given in (15) . For a given , if , we set ; otherwise we assign the following rates:
APPENDIX G PROOF OF COROLLARY 7
Achievability follows from Theorem 1 by only utilizing and together with the channel condition given in (16) . For a given , if , we set ; otherwise we assign the following rates:
APPENDIX H PROOF OF COROLLARY 9
For a given MAC-E with , we consider an IC-E defined by and utilize Theorem 1 with satisfying (17) . Then, the achievable region becomes (51) where and . Hence, is achievable for any satisfying (17) .
The following outer bound on the sum rate follows by Theorem 3, as the constructed IC-E satisfies the needed condition of the theorem for any
. Which is what needed to be shown.
APPENDIX I PROOF OF COROLLARY 10
We first remark that will remain the same if we restrict the union over the set of probability distributions As for any satisfying , since in this case. And the highest rate achievable with the NF scheme occurs if is chosen to be deterministic, and hence, case will result in the highest rate among the probability distributions satisfying . Therefore, without loss of generality, we can write where . Now, fix some , and set , , and
, where we set if the latter is negative. Here is achievable, i.e., for any . Observing that , we conclude that the noise forwarding (NF) scheme of [18] is a special case of the proposed scheme.
APPENDIX J PROOF OF COROLLARY 11
For any given satisfying , we see that is achievable due to (21) and Corollary 10. The converse follows by Theorem 3 as the needed condition is satisfied by considering an IC-E defined as , where we set in the upper bound as the time sharing random variable is not needed for this scenario, and further limit the input distributions to satisfy . The latter does not reduce the maximization for the upper bound due to a similar reasoning given in the Proof of Corollary 10.
